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ABSTRACT
Frequent shifts in tax policy can increase uncertainty about future
net-of-tax wages and interest income. Thispaper measures the impact of
uncertain tax policy on savings, labor supply, and welfare in the United
States. A vector autoregression model with six variableswas estimated
which found the standard error of the one-year-ahead forecast forthe wage
tax to be 1.8 percentage points, and for the interest incometax 3.3
percentage points. Furthermore, the negative correlation between
unanticipated shifts in the real interest rate and changes in the interest
income tax amplifies the variability in the real after-taxreturn.
A two-period model of consumption and laborsupply is developed that
measures the effect of uncertain taxes on savings, work hours, andtaxpayer
welfare. Using plausible empirical parameters, it is shown thatremoving
all uncertainty about future tax policy can lead toa welfare gain of 0.4




Charlottesville, VA 22901It is as inevitable as death and taxes that Congress will
tinker with the tax code.
--SenatorDaniel Quayle1
I. Introduction
Traditional studies that measure the excess burden of taxation assume
that tax rates are certain and unchanging, at least until the government
decides to change them. However, recent experience in the United States has
emphasized that taxpayers are justified in treating taxes as another
unpredictable factor in an uncertain world. For example, following the
passage of the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, a number of provisions, such
as the controversial rule allowing the trading of corporate tax credits,
immediately came under attack. The threat of repeal discouraged many firms.
from taking advantage of the tax cuts; the chairman of one corporation, able
to sell benefits for less than half their estimated value, attributed the
low price to the "risk of losing the tax benefits through a change in the
tax law or other contingencies." (Clark, 1981). Currently, few agree on the
final outcome of the President's tax reform efforts, leading to considerable
uncertainty about the future marginal tax rate (which may range between 27
and 38 percent under Senate and House proposals), as well as the tax
treatment of specific investment classes.
The potential dangers of uncertain taxes have been recognized since
Adam Smith, who observed that "The certainty of what each individual ought
to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance, that a very
considerable degree of inequality, .. . isnot near so great an evil as a very
1Quoted in Clark (1983).2
small degree of uncertainty." (Smith, 1976; II: 351)2 This view suggests
that the proper role for the government is to reduce uncertainty about
future tax rates. However, there are two reasons why unexpected variations
in tax rates may increase, rather than decrease, economic welfare. First,
if the income fluctuation is positively correlated with the tax rate, the
variance of net-of-tax income may be reduced, thereby benefitting the
risk-averse taxpayer. In a progressive tax system, for example, a rise in
income is partially offset by a rise in tax rates, while a fall in income is
cushioned by a decline in tax rates. The second reason was suggested by
Stiglitz (1982) and Weiss (1976), who argued that random taxation can
increase social welfare in the presence of existing taxes. The idea is that
the tax uncertainty can cause consumers to work more and save more, thereby
increasing revenues and partly offsetting the distortion caused by the
initial labor and capital income taxation.3
This paper measures the uncertain component of wage and interest income
taxes during the period 1929-75. Marginal tax rates calculated by Joines
(1981) are used in a vector autoregression (VAR) model which includes
government expenditure and debt, interest rates, and earnings. The
2Smith's concern was that theuncertainty of taxation "encourages the
insolence and favors the corruption" of the tax collection agents.
Currently, those who write the code, rather than those who collect
taxes, might be more subject to lobbying efforts. See also the 1982
Economic Report of the President, p.111.
3Even if labor supply andsavings increases, the consumer may still be
worse off owing to the additional uncertainty introduced by the random
taxes. The result depends on the strong convexity of the marginal
utility function and a weak degree of risk aversion. Also see Chang
and Wildasin (1985).3
estimated coefficients indicate that the one-year-ahead forecast error of
the wage tax is 1.8 percentage points, and for the capital income tax 3.3
percent. While unexpected shifts in the wage rate are positively correlated
with the wage tax, unexpected shifts in the interest income tax are
negatively correlated with the interest rate. One reason for this negative
correlation is that unexpected jumps in inflation rates tend to both
decrease real ex post interest rates and increase the real tax on interest
income. The interest income tax therefore accentuates interest rate
uncertainty. Using empirical parameters in a two period model, the annual
cost of uncertain taxes is estimated to be 0.4 percent of national income,
-. . 4 or 12 billion dollars 1n 1985.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses recent studies of tax uncertainty and presents a simplegeneral-
equilibrium model of consumer, government, and production sectors which
jointly determine labor supply, savings, taxes, government expenditures, and
debt. In Section III, a VAR corresponding to the reduced form of this model
is estimated. Section IV provides a numerically computable model of
individual consumption and labor supply decisions solved subject to the VAR
estimates, while Section V concludes.
II. A Simple Model of Uncertain Tax Policy
There has been recent interest in the implications of uncertain or
unpredictable tax policy. Judd (1984) focused on how the timing of future
tax increases affects current labor supply and consumption in a general
4mis result is nota test of the Stiglitz-weiss hypothesis, which may
hold for some (e.g., interternporally nonseparable) utility functions.4
equilibrium model. He found that for plausible parameters, increased
uncertainty about when a future capital income tax would occur led to rising
current labor supply and savings. Auerbach and Hines (1986) emphasized the
dramatic variations in investment tax incentives during the postwar period,
leading to effective tax rates for myopic investors ranging from -19 percent
in 1982 to 61 percent in 1953. They compared optimal investment patterns of
individuals with myopic expectations and those with perfect foresight in a
model which included adjustment costs.
Most recently, Kaplow (1986 a,b) has argued that the government should
not compensate taxpayers for unexpected changes in tax rates. Government
compensation introduces moral hazard; firms need not avoid investing in
activities which the government later wishes to discourage through taxation.
Private insurance companies are thought to be the proper institution for
spreading risk.
In the model below, individual taxpayers form rational expectations
about future taxes, wages, and interest rates. Unlike Kaplow's analysis, it
is assumed that the unexpected tax shifts may not be justified on efficiency
grounds, but often reflect unexpected inflation, expenditures, or policy
vacilations. The general equilibrium model of wage, interest income,
taxation, saving, and labor supply is based on three sectors. The first
comprises consumers, who make labor supply and savings choices contingent on
expectations about future net-of-tax wage and interest rates. The second is
the production sector, which relates the supply of labor and capital to
gross-of-tax wage rates and interest rates. Third, the government sector
simultaneously determines expenditure, debt, and marginal tax rates5
necessary to collect tax revenue. The model is used primarly to establish
the structure of expectations that rational consumers use to predict future
net wage and interest rates.
Utility depends on current and future leisure and consumption,
U U(C,) +E(U(C2,2)} (1)
where C. and represent consumption and leisure, respectively, and E is
the expectations operator conditional on information at period 1. The
timing of the model is that individuals choose labor supply at the outset of
the period. At the end of the period, wages and interest rates are
realized, taxes are paid, and the consumption decision is made. Labor
supply decisions are determined before the net wage is realized to reflect
human capital investments and occupational choices made early in the life
cycle which affect subsequent work effort.5 Although there is no specific
bequest function, C2 can be thought of as combining second period
consumption and any bequests or assets retained for a later period.6 The
budget constraint is
* eU





5Alternatively, labor supply could be chosen after thewage is
realized. However, such a model leads to no uncertainty about the
marginal tradeoff between C2 and £2.
6For example,utility U(2,B2) can be maximized subject to C2 =
C2+
B2where C2 measures actual second period consumption andB2 bequests
or assets passed to the next period. Holding the relative price of
bequests and consumption constant, the indirect utility function
corresponding to U would be V(C2) which could then be substituted
into (1).6
where w and r? are gross-of-tax wages and interest rates, h. measures hours
of work, and 8 =h.+ 1., where 0 is the total hours available for work and
1 1
leisure. Tax revenue in a given period is a function R of earned income y
=whand unearned income y' =S.r, where S measures savings at period 11 1 i-li 0
O (or assets at the outset of period 1) and
S1 =S(l+r)+ wh1 -R(y,y)
-
C1.
The progressive nature of the U.S. tax system leads to a divergence
between the average and the marginal rates. Although the actual tax code is
complex and non-linear, it can be approximated as a negative income tax,
with a guaranteed lump-sum subsidy during the two periods of p > 0 and
marginal tax rates t. on wage and r. on interest income. The present value
of revenue is therefore
* * t2h2w + r2S1r -p
t1h1w1 + r1S0r1 -p+ * (3)
(l+r2)
Substituting (3) into (2) and rearranging yields
C2 h0w0
C + =X+hw + (4) 1
1-Fr2 11 l+r
*
where r. =r.(l-r.),w. =w.(l-t.),so that r. and w. represent marginal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
after-tax interest rates and wages, while X measures "virtual" nonwage
• -l 7
income S0(l+r1) + p[l+(l+r2)
A linear homogenous production function is specified of the form
y. =f.(k.,h.)
11 1 1
where y1, output, depends on capital k. and labor h., and all variables are
expressed in per capita terms. The production function f. is allowed to
7Whilep is assumed constant, if the extent of income redistribution
were uncertain, p would be random as well.7
move randomly over time, leading to unpredictable variations in the marginal
product of capital 8f./3k. or the marginal product of labor 3f./ah., holding
k. and h. constant. This degree of randomness ensures uncertainty about
final factor prices, w =Bf./ah.,and ri =0f./ak..
Note finally that aggregate capital stock is a function of current
savings and government debt D. k. S. -D..One could expand the 11 1 1
definition of the capital stock and of labor supply to include savings and
work choices of other generations, but such an assumption complicates the
model and will not affect the results.
The government sector is assumed to maximize a time-specific objective
function of the form
V. =V.(g.,d.,t.,r.) (5)
where g. is the ratio of government spending to GNP, and d. the ratio of
privately held government debt to GNP.8 The restrictions on the derivatives
of V are that governments will always prefer to spendmore, holding debt and
taxes constant (BV./ag. > 0) and will always be worse off for a given level
of spending with higher marginal tax rates or debt(3V/8x < 0, x
t.,r.,d.). The determination of overall expenditures tax rates and debt 1 1 1
will be affected by labor supply and savings choices, since the "price" of
an extra unit of g. financed by increasing the wage taxt is simply y./w?h.
evaluated at t.= Becausethe efficiency cost of a tax rises
8Expenditures and debt are expressedas a ratio of GNP rather than per
capita to maintain comparability with other studies of government
behavior. I abstract from issues of time-inconsistency in this model
of government behavior.
9 * Evaluated at t. =0,ÔR/Bt. is simply w.h., so the price of goverment8
approximately by the squared value of the marginal distortion, Barro (1979)
has suggested that the optimal solution of the government is to set constant
marginal rates over time, and use debt to cushion unexpected expenditures
(e.g., during wartime). The formulation presented here, however, suggests a
greater degree of variation in taxes and expenditures, as shifts in savings
and labor supply affect the "price" of expenditures, and as a new
administration leads to a potentially different objective function V1.
From equations (1) and (4), current labor supply and savings decisions
depend on the expected value and the distribution of future net wages and
interest rates. We therefore presume that individuals making these choices
in period i-i use the information set available at that time to forecast
future net wage and interest rates in period i. Consider first the general
equilibrium solution to the vector of factor prices written as
=(w.,r.}'.Factor prices will depend on the capital-labor ratio, and
hence on total debt and on labor supply and savings chosen using information
from the previous period. Thus P. can be expressed as a function of
concurrent government policy, lagged labor supply and savings decisions
(which in turn depended on lagged values of P and taxes) and an error term.
Letting C. =(g.d. t. i-.)' and writing in linear form
1 1 1 1 1
P. =AP. A C. A C. + v . (6) 1 1 i-l 2 1 3 i-i li
where A. j =1,2,3,represents matrices of coefficients, and v1. is a vector
of error terms.
The choice of government variables will also depend on past debt and
spending per GNP is y./wh..9
expenditure commitments (such as entitlement programs), on the size of the.
tax base (which in turn depends on current and lagged P and taxes), and on
an error term measuring unexpected shifts in expenditures or tax rates
C. =1G.1+ 2E'1 + + v2. (7)
where v2. represents a vector of error terms. Combining equations (6) and
(7), and successively substituting yields the reduced form
F.=IfF.+v. (8) 1 i-i 1 * * whereF. ={g.d. w. r. t. r.}', andis the vector of reduced form 11 1 1 1 1 1
coefficients.
The two-period formulation has often been used to characterize
"working" and "retirement" stages of the life cycle. In this model, the
second period need not correspond to retirement; the essential feature of
the prediction problem faced by consumers, however, is that they must make
current savings (and human capital) decisions which will subsequently be
affected by tax policy for a number of years in the future. Since consumers
are making decisions about future consumption and labor supply over a number
of years, their goal is to predict average taxes and factor prices (and the
variance of those averages) over the future time horizon. In particular, it
is assumed that the representative future horizon corresponds to consumption
and labor supply at ages 50-59 planned from the perspective ofage 35. The
forecast relevant to the 35-year old is not simply the value (and variance)
of a tax rate in some future year, but the average tax over the entire
lO-year period.10 The next step is to show how the VARmodelusing annual
10The arithimeticmean approximates the (geometric) effective tax rate
on interest income.10
data (which we observe) translates into the optimal prediction of average
tax rates and factor prices 15-25 years in the future. Using q to denote the
year, and I'qand II (without —) the vector of (annual) dependent variables and
the corresponding matrix of VAR coefficients, respectively,
F=IIF +€ (9)
q+l q q'
where eis assumed normal and independent over time. Let the forecast m
period stretch from j-d to j+d years in the future (in the example above,
between 15 and 25 years). Then the optimal forecast of F÷1, averaged over
11 N =2d+1years in the future, is
j +d
F Fm/N =wr0 (10)
m=j -d
where F E(I' ) =
m m 0
The optimal prediction of any (yearly) vector F at a future year m is
while the average of f' over the N years is simply F. The error of a
single year's prediction can be written
r-r= +1132+...+c (11) m m 1 2 m
After some rearrangement, the variance of the prediction F is expressed
12
as
11The notation isslightly different when N is even.
12








flkf(flk)l + fl(flm)) (12)
k=O k=O m=O
where =11k, E(e'), and=I,the identity matrix.
In the next section, II and E are estimated using U.S. data; these
matrices are then transformed into the prediction of F and its
variance-covariance matrix, .
III.A VAR Model of Expenditure, Debt. Income, and Taxes
The estimation of equation (9) uses yearly U.S. data between 1929 and
1975 in real 1972 dollars. The measure of privately heldgovernment debt is
from Barro (1979), while combined federal and stategovernment expenditures
are calculated from the National Income and Product Accounts. Owing to
difficulty in measuring wages since 1929, earnings are estimated in the VAR
model and subsequently converted to wage rates for the numerical
calculations. Earnings are likely to vary more thanwage rates if hours of
work are positively correlated with wages. However,average earnings will
also understate the risk of unemployment. Earnings are definedas the ratio
of employee compensation to total non-agricultural employees, while realex
post interest rates are defined as the Moody Aaa bond rate minus the change
in the GNP deflator (Economic Report of the President, 1985).
Joines (1981) calculated effective marginal tax rates on capital income
and labor income during 1929-75. The labor income tax is the marginal tax12
on labor income, weighted by the share of labor income in each marginal
bracket. Taxes on labor income are defined as state and local
(proportional) taxes plus federal wage, salary and social security taxes,
plus taxes on miscellaneous income (which is included as earned income).13
Capital income includes interest and dividend income plus taxable capital
gains,14 while the capital income tax is comprised of state and local
proportional taxes, corporate, dividend, interest, and other unearned income
taxation.
There are two ways to measure marginal tax rates. The first takes an
average of the statutory marginal rates, weighted by taxable income (Barro
and Sahasakul, 1983a,b; Estrella and Fuhrer, 1983). This paper uses the
second measure of marginal taxes (Joines, 1981; Seater, 1985) which
calculates the actual (weighted) change in tax payments as income grows.
* * * Thatis, the marginal tax is defined as (T-T )/(Y-Y ),whereT and T are
* actualtaxes paid, and Y and Y adjusted gross income, in adjacent
brackets
15
13Miscellaneous income waspartnership income plus business income
plus farm income. Assuming that miscellaneous income was attributed
to capital income generally made less than 1 percentage point
difference in the tax rate (Joines, 1981).
alternative definition of income excluding capital gains leads to
only slightly different tax rates. There might have been greater
variability in tax rates if the "inflation premium" for interest and
dividend income had been excluded from the tax base.
15The second measure used in thispaper accounts for available
deductions and exemptions that tend to rise for higher income
taxpayers, and would tend to make the consumer's effective marginal
rate less than the statutory rate. It may understate the true
marginal rate, since the tax preferred goods will be less highly
valued at the margin. See Barro and Sahasakul (1983a) and Seater
(1985).13
Estimates of the VAR model are presented in Table 1. These
coefficients should be interpreted cautiously since they measure the reduced
form of the structural model. The coefficient of lagged expenditures on
current debt, 0.992 (t-statistic of 6.20), and the insignificance of lagged
debt on wage taxes or interest income taxes lends support to Barro's (1979)
hypothesis that governments meet shifts in expenditures primarly by issuing
debt rather than raising taxes. However, the negative and significant
effect of lagged debt on current expenditures also suggests that increasing
levels of debt tends to reduce expenditures. Additional lagged variables
were not generally significant.16
The correlation coefficients for the contemporaneous residuals are also
presented in Table 1.The interpretation of the covariance structure is
more relevant to the study of how uncertain taxes interact with other
factors. For example, the positive correlation (0.457) betweenearnings and
wage taxes means that an unexpected drop in earnings (or holding hours per
worker constant, wages) will lead to a lower than expectedwage tax. Thus
the worker is partially "insured" by the knowledge that netwages will not
drop by the full proportional amount of the gross wage decrease. The
negative covariance between the interest income tax and real interest rates
leads to even more uncertainty in the net-of-tax rate ofreturn;
unexpectedly low gross interest rates are associated with high taxes, and
conversely. This negative correlation may be caused by unexpected
16The onlyexception was the interest rate regression, in which the
dependent variable lagged 2 years was strongly significant. To
preserve computational simplicity, however, a first-order lag
structure was assumed for the entire VAR model.14
inflation, which tends to reduce ex-post real interest rates and increase
effective tax rates. The standard error of the one-year forecast is 1.8
percent for the wage tax and 3.3 percent for the interest income tax.
The Joines data stop at 1975, so that measures of effective tax rates
from King and Fullerton (1985) are used for 1980. Weighted effective tax
rates for capital income including insurance companies and non-profit
institutions were 37.2 percent, and the tax on labor income plus the measure
of social security taxes (Barro and Sahasakul, 1983) yields 37.1 percent.
The 1980 average wage and interest rates were $5.02 and 2.7 percent,
respectively. The coefficents of W used to predict F are presented in Table
2, along with the initial (1980) variables and the predictions. Assuming
stationarity of the model, the optimal prediction is that earnings will rise
from $10,040 to $12,160 in real terms, the government will erase its debt,
the wage tax will fall to 31.7 percent (3.5 percent standard error) and the
interest income tax will rise to 44.2 percent (4.4 percent standard error).
Correlation coefficients of ,thevariance-covariance matrix of F, are
also presented in Table 2. In the long run, there is virtually no
correlation between the error terms for gross wages and capital income
taxes. The positive covariance between earnings and wage taxes (0.932) and
the negative covariance between interest taxes and the interest rate
(-0.744) become more pronounced in the 20 year forecasts. The next step is
to measure how this uncertainty affects consumer's consumption, labor
supply, and utility.15
IV. A Model of Consumption and Labor Supply
The utility function in equation (1) isspecified as
EU =((a+ + E((l+5)(a + C)))/7 (13)
where & is the time preference rate, anda is a parameter reflecting the
relative tradeoff between leisure andconsumption in a particular year. The
leisure-consumption elasticity of substitution isa =l/(l-p),while
l/(l--y)isthe elasticity of substitution between household"output" in year
1 and in year 2.17
Using the budget constraint from equation (4), the first order












and H.=a,e+c 1 1 1
17Thisutility function assumes that the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (a) is equal to the inverse of the Arrow-Prattrelative
risk aversion measure. They need not be; a nionotonictransformation
of EU could imply different values of the(inverse) Arrow Pratt
measure and the elasticity of substitution (Hall, 1985).
18
In general, l is predetermined, since itwas chosen at time 0.
Assuming that it is freely chosen, as is done here, will tend to
understate the true welfare cost of taxuncertainty.16
Equations (14a) and (14b) are highly non-linear, and can be solved
using numerical methods. Note that the consumption and labor supply
decisions depend only on wages, the interest rate r2 (which is the annual
interest rate accumulated over the n-year period), and taxes, but not on
government expenditures and debt. Writing wages as earnings divided by 1830
hours (see below), denoting the LHS of (14a) as Mc and the UIS of (l4b) as





-a1 -a2 -a3 -a4
where is the truncated density function of normally distributed
random variables with mean F and variance-covariance matrix given by the
corresponding 4x4 submatrix of 2 (Johnson and Kotz, 1972; p. 40). The
limits of integration given by a. prevent explosive solutions (e.g., if r2 <
-1) and reduce computational costs.
The parameters of the utility function were chosen to be consistent
with life cycle consumption and labor choices for a representative
individual between ages 30 and 40 making decisions about labor supply and
consumption for ages 50-60. The Consumer Expenditure Survey of 1972-73 was
used to measure household consumption and work hours for both the 30-39 year
olds and the 50-59 year olds. Average consumption for the 30-39 year old
families was $9400, while gross-of-tax earnings were $12,400 and assets
(which includes the market value of the house) were $19,000, or the
potential for consuming an additional $1900 per year over the 10 year
period. Using information from the Survey on actual taxes paid, "virtual"17
income given the linear marginal tax rates was calculated to be $6500.
Labor supply was assigned by multiplying the number of weeks workedduring
the past year times 40 hours (if a full time worker), 20 hours (ifpart
time) or 0 hours (if reported not working). Average hours for the 30-39
year old were approximately 1830 yearly hours, while 50-59 year olds worked
an average 1680 hours.
There is substantial evidence about the value of -y.Friend and Blume
(1975) in their study of financial portfolio decisions suggested that was
less than 0.5, while Ghez and Becker (1975) placed on a anupper bound of
0.28. Skinner (1985) found estimates between 0.25 and 0.5,although Hansen
and Singleton (1983) and Weber (1970,1975) found valuesgenerally exceeding
0.5.I assume that 0.35, although the model is tested for higher and
lower elasticities.
The evidence on the uncompensated labor supply elasticity in static
models suggests an average elasticity of approximately 0.3.19 The link
between the elasticity of substitution and the conventional labor supply
elasticitiy is complex, since changes in the wage rate will also have an
impact on the dynamic path of labor supply. If we assume that thewage
change is foreseen, it can be shown the implieda corresponding to the 0.3
labor supply response will be approximately 0520 The timepreference rate
19
From Killingsworth (1983; pp. 119-124), men's labor supplyappears
to be at most 0, while for women it is at least 1.0 (although there is
considerable variability in coefficient estimates across studies).
Weighting the two elasticities by labor force participation yields an
average of 0.4. However, other studies of aggregate labor supply
(Killingsworth, 1983; p. 125) report elasticities primarly less than
0.2; thus a midpoint of 0.3 is adopted.18
S was chosen to replicate the observed level of consumption in the first
period ($9400), total time endowment 0 was set to 4000 hours, and the
leisure preference parameter a was adjusted to insure 1830 hours were spent
working in the first period.21
Comparing a regime with taxes that have a random component and taxes
that can be forecast with compelete certainty is problematic, since
switching to certain taxes will have general equilibrium effects on the
distribution of gross wage and interest rates. However, we can pose the
following conceptual experiment -- whatare the effects of certain taxes on
an individual given the variance-covariance structure of gross wage and
interest rates? That is, under the status quo of uncertain taxation,
consumption and labor supply are chosen which satisfy (14a) and (14b)
integrated over uncertain w2, r2, t2,r2. This outcome is compared to
certain taxation, in which savings and labor supply are chosen subject to
(14a) and (l4b) integrated over uncertain w and r, holdingt2 and
constant (i.e., perfectly foreseeable) at their mean values. Thegovernment
can expect to raise equal revenue in both cases.
O The labor supply parameter can be transformed intoa by solving for
-8/8w(w/(O-) in the certainty model; the general solution for
n-period models of this sort can be found in NBER Working Paper 819,
an early version of Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner (1983).
21The distribution ofuncertain wages, interest rates, and taxes was
truncated by a rectangle 2.5 standard deviations above and below the
mean for all four variables, encompassing 96.3 percent of the normal
distribution. The mean value of the gross interest rate used in the
simulation, r' ,wasadjusted to ensure that its expected value
E((1±r')19) was equal to the perfectcertainty interest rate (LO)'19
The first row of Table 3 presents the results of themodel for the
baseline parameters of and a. When certain taxes are imposed, hours of
work rise by 0.1 percent in the first period, and fallby 1.8 percent in the
second period. The explanation for these changes is that thecertain tax
regime reduces the variance in net interest rates. Thusproviding for C2 is
more easily achieved by saving in the first period, rather thanworking
extra hours in the second period; overall savings risesby a total of 0.8
percent.
The utility gain of certain tax policy isexpressed as a proportion of
the present value of lifetime income. AsStiglitz (1982) and Weiss (1976)
have emphasized, increased revenue fromuncertain taxes can potentially
raise sufficient revenue to offset the loss inutility of risk averse
consumers. Thus the welfare change is measured as the dollarvalue of the
shift in ex ante utility plus therevenue gain (or loss) from certain
taxation. Column 6 indicates that for theparameters a =0.35and
=0.50,the welfare gain of certain tax rates is 0.4percent of lifetime
income. Conversely, the annual loss of uncertaintaxation, expressed as a
proportion of 1985 U.s. national income, is $12 billion.
This finding is not particularly sensitiveto alternative
specifications of the utility function. Rows 2-5present results from the
numerically computable model for different values ofcrc and a. Row 2 uses
an intertenporal elasticity of 1.35; whilesavings and labor supply is more
responsive to the more certain tax policy, the welfare gain isonly 0.2
percent. A high intertemporal elasticity of substitution is alsoequivalent20
to a low degree of risk aversion in this model; hence the reduction in
income variation is less valuable. When the labor elasticity is set to 1.5
(row 3) the results differ slightly from the baseline case in row 1; there
is a 0.4 percent welfare gain from certain taxation. The benefits of
certain taxation are 0.5 percent of income when a =0.15,reflecting the
greater degree of risk aversion, while when the labor supply elasticity is
0.15, the efficiency gain of certain taxation is 0.8 percent. The doubling
of the welfare gain reflects the modest substitutability between
predetermined £2 and random C2. Finally, the 6th row describes the welfare
gain of uncertain taxes when virtual income is increased from $6500 to
$8500. Because the consumer saves a larger fraction of income, and hence is
subject to greater uncertainty from the interest income tax, the gain of
certainty in tax policy rises from 0.4 percent to 0.6 percent. This
calculation provides support for the notion that the interest income tax,
both because of its greater variability, and its negative correlation with
real interest rates, causes the greatest harm to risk-averse taxpayers.
One extension of this model would be to introduce government
expenditures explicitly into the utility function. The assumption of the
current model is that expenditures enter utility independently of private
consumption goods. However, if government expenditures (e.g. ,medicare,
housing, social security) substitute for private expenditures, then
taxpayers would be partially compensated for expenditure increases
associated with tax hikes. If government expenditures did substitute for
private goods, then the welfare cost of uncertain tax policy would be
reduced.21
V. Conclusion
The traditional analysis of uncertainty and taxationfocused on the
beneficial effects of a certain tax on the return froma risky asset
(Stiglitz, 1969; Eaton and Rosen, 1980; Kanbur, 1983) Thegovernment, by
collecting a fixed proportion of the return, or subsidizinga fixed
proportion of the loss, shares the risk of the investment. Thispaper has
shown that tax rates in the United States havedisplayed considerable
variability during the period 1929-1975, thereby eroding thepotential
benefits of taxes in reducing risk. The additionalexcess burden of
uncertain rather than certain tax policy is estimatedto be 0.4 percent of
GNP, or $12 billion in 1985. The randomcomponents of the wage and its tax
rate are positively correlated, but the randomcomponents of the real
interest rate and its tax rate arenegatively correlated, suggesting that
capital income taxation increases thevariability of net interest rates.
Uncertain tax policy may also be harmful if"permanent" tax cuts are
perceived by taxpayers as random and unlikely topersist in the future.
Although the perceived temporary tax cutsmay stimulate short-run
investment, the loss in revenue may not becompensated for by an increase in
long-term investment (Skinner, 1984).
Tax policy is often unpredictable because of factorsbeyond the control
of the government. However, the cost ofextensive tinkering with the tax
code should be recognized. Furthermore, the valueof tax provisions that
are flexible to future economic conditions, suchas the indexing of capital22
gains to inflation, are substantial in an uncertain environment. Neither
the government nor the taxpayer gain from tax codes which must constantly be
adjusted in light of differing rates of inflation or economic activity.
While taxes may be inevitable, they need not be as unpredictable.References
Auerbach, Alan J. and Hines, James R.
,"TaxReform, Investment, and
the Value of the Firm," N.B.E.R. Working Paper #1803 (January 1986).
Auerbach, Alan J. ,Kotlikoff,Laurence J., and Jonathan Skinner, "The
Efficiency Gains from Dynamic Tax Reform", International Economic
Review, (February 1983).
Barro, Robert J., "On the Determination of Public Debt", Journal of
Political Economy 87 (October 1979): 940-971.
Barro, Robert J., "The Behavior of U.S. Deficits," N.B.E.R. Working
Paper #1319 (March 1984).
Barro, Robert J., and Chaipat Sahasakul, "Measuring the Average
Marginal Tax Rate from the Individual Income Tax", Journal of Business
(October 1983a).
Barro, Robert J., and Chaipat Sahasakul, "Average Marginal Tax Rates
from Social Security and the Individual Income Tax", NBERWorking
Paper 1214 (October l983b).
Clark, Timothy, "Selling Tax Breaks -- IfBoth Parties Benefit, Then
WhyisCongress Unhappy?," National Journal (December 19, 1981).
Clark, Timothy, "Tinkering with the Tax Code," National Journal
(February 19, 1983).
Chang, F. R., and Wildasin, D. E. "Local Randomization of Commodity
Taxes," mimeo, (March 1985).
Eaton, Jonathan, and Harvey Rosen, "Labor Supply, Uncertainty, and
Efficient Taxation," Journal of Public Economics 14 (1980): 365-374.
Estrella, Arturo, and Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, "Average Marginal Tax Rates
for U.S. Household Interest and Dividend Income1954-1980," NBER
Working Paper 1201 (September 1984).
Friend, Irwin, and Marshall E. Blume, "The Demand for Risky Assets,"
American Economic Review (December 1975): 900-922.
Ghez, Gilbert, and Gary S. Becker, The Allocation of Time and Goods
Over the Life Cycle. New York: Columbia University Press (1975).
Hall, Robert, "Real Interest and Consumption," N.B.E.R. Working Paper
#1694 (August 1985).Hansen, Lars Peter, and Kenneth J. Singleton, "Stochastic Consumption,
Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of Asset Returns," Journal of
Political Economic 91 (April 1983): 249-265.
Johnson, Norman J. and Samuel Kotz, Distributions in Statistics:
Continuous Multivariate Distributions. Wiley (1972)
Joines, Douglas, "Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Factor
Income," Journal of Business (1981) pp. 191-226.
Judd, Kenneth L., "Short-run Effects of Uncertainty About the Timing
of Future Taxes," mimeo (October 1984).
Kanbur, S.M. Ravi, "Labour Supply Under Uncertainty with Piecewise
Linear Tax Regimes," Economica (November 1983): 379-394.
Kaplow, Louis, "An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions," Harvard
Law Review 99, (1986a): 509-617.
Kaplow, Louis, "Optimal Government Policy Toward Risk Imposed By
Uncertainty Concerning Future Government Action," mimeo,
(March 1986b).
Killingsworth, Mark, Labor Supply. Cambridge University Press (1983).
King, Mervyn A. and Don Fullerton, The Taxation of Income from
Capital. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1984).
Seater, John, "On the Construction of Marginal Federal Personal and
Social Security Tax Rates in the United States," Journal of Monetary
Economics 15 (January 1985): 121-136.
Skinner, Jonathan, "Uncertain Tax Policy and Economic Efficiency,"
mimeo (1984).
Skinner, Jonathan, "Variable Lifespan and the Interest Sensitivity of
Consumption," Review of Economics and Statistics (November 1985):
Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press (1976).
Stiglitz, Joseph E. ,"TheEffects of Income, Wealth, and Capital Gains
Taxation on Risk-Taking," Quarterly Journal of Economics (1969):
263-283.
Stiglitz, Joseph E., "Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case
for Random Taxation," Journal of Public Economics 18 (1982): 1-33.
Weber, Warren E., "The Effect of Interest Rates on Aggregate
Consumption," American Economic Review (September 1970): 591-600.Weber, Warren E. ,"InterestRates, Inflation, and Consumer
Expenditures," American Economic Review (December 1975): 843-858.
Weiss, Laurence, "The Desirability of Cheating Incentive and
Randomness in the Optimal Income Tax," Journal of Political Economy 84
(December 1976): 1343-1352.Table 1: Coefficient Matrix of the VAR Model
and Correlation Coefficients of the Residuals
Correlation Coefficients of Residuals
Equation: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Expend. DebtEarningsTnt. RateWage TaxTnt. Tax
Lagged:
Expenditures 1.023 0.992 3.729 0.249-0.014 0.001













Earnings -0.033 -0.048 0.443 -0.051 0.009 0.012













Wage Tax 0.256 -0.079 9.923 1.336 0.631 -0.413
(0.62) (0.15) (2.94) (3.44) (4.71) 1.02
Tnt. Income Tax 0.303 0.049 -0.594 -0.611 0.181 0.987
(1.52)(0.20) (0.40)(3.29)(2.82) 5.14
Constant 0.158 0.177 2.578 0.421 -0.071 -0.0237
(1.51) (1.40) (3.23) (4.28) (2.09) 0.23
R-Bar Squared 0.816 0.964 0.975 0.576 0.973 0.821
Standard Error 0.034 0.041 0.254 0.031 0.018 0.033
Expend. DebtEarningsInterestWage TaxTnt. Tax
Expenditures 1.000
Debt 0.759 1.000
Earnings 0.679 0.333 1.000
Interest Rates 0.186 0.438 0.419 1.000
Wage Tax 0.533 0.234 0.457 -0.062 1.000








Table 2: Matrix of Coefficients and Residual Correlation
Coefficients for Predictions 1995-2005
Correlation Coefficients of Residuals
Expend. Debt Earnings mt. RateWage Taxmt. Tax
Expenditures -0.040 0.350 -2.299 -0.040 -0.562 0.557
Debt -0.034 0.214 -1.520 -0.026 -0.370 0.318
Earnings 0.007 -0.049 0.341 0.005 0.008 -0.008
Interest Rate 0.036 -0.262 1.852 0.032 0.051 -0.032
Wage Tax 0.219 -1.651 11.898 0.175 0.304 -0.244
mt. Income Tax 0.057 -0.265 2.144 0.035 0.061 -0.022
Constant 0.222 0.870 4.667 -0.034 0.127 0.592
1980 Baseline 0.364 0.234 10.04 0.027 0.371 0.372
Estimate1995-04 0.372 -0.160 12.16 0.077 0.317 0.442
S. E. ofEstimate 0.039 0.117 0.875 0.023 0.035 0.044
Expenditures i. 000
Debt 0.152 1.000
Earnings 0.740 -0.388 1.000
Interest Rates -0.502 -0.730 -0.003 1.000
Wage Tax 0.770 -0.112 0.932 -0.226 1.000
mt. Income Tax 0.721Table 3: Savings, Labor Supply, and the Excess Burden of
Certain and Uncertain Tax Policies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inter- Leisure-Change in 1st Change in 2nd Change in Welfare
temporal Consump. Period HoursPeriod Hours Savings Gain
Elasticity Elasticity of Work of Work
(ç)()
Row:
1 0.35 0.50 0.1 -1.8 0.8 0.4
2 1.35 0.50 0.8 -2.3 3.5 0.2
3 0.35 1.50 0.1 -1.0 0.6 0.4
4 0.15 0.50 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 0.5
5 0.35 0.15 0.5 -2.5 1.8 0.8
6* 0.35 0.50 0.1 -3.6 0.2 0.6
Notes: The utility parameters are adjusted so that first period consunption
is $9400 and first period labor supply is 1830 annual hours in the perfect
foresight case for each numerical simulation. All changes are in
percentage terms. Welfare gain is expressed as a percentage of lifetime income.
*Non-wageincome is $8500 rather than $6500.